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ABSTRACT
Security Sector Reform (SSR) remains a key feature of peacebuilding
interventions and is usually undertaken by a state alongside
national and international partners. External actors engaged in
SSR tend to follow a normative agenda that often has little regard
for the context in post-conﬂict societies. Despite recurrent
criticism, SSR practices of international organisations and bilateral
donors often remain focused on state institutions, and often do
not suﬃciently attend to alternative providers of security or
existing normative frameworks of security. This article provides a
critical overview of existing research and introduces the special
issue on ‘Co-operation, Contestation and Complexity in Post-
Conﬂict Security Sector Reform’. We explore three aspects that
add an important piece to the puzzle of what constitutes eﬀective
SSR. First, the variation of norm adoption, norm contestation and
norm imposition in post-conﬂict countries that might explain the
mixed results in terms of peacebuilding. Second, the multitude of
diﬀerent security actors within and beyond the state which often
leads to multiple patterns of co-operation and contestation within
reform programmes. And third, how both the multiplicity of and
tension between norms and actors further complicate eﬀorts to
build peace or, as complexity theory would posit, inﬂuence the
complex and non-linear social system that is the conﬂict-aﬀected
environment.
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In the aftermath of conﬂict, Security Sector Reform (SSR) continues to bewidely regarded by
policy makers and practitioners as one of the most vital tasks in the peacebuilding endea-
vour (Jackson 2018; Sedra 2018, 2010; UN 2013, 2008). While there is no agreed deﬁnition,
for policy-makers and practitioners, SSR typically refers to the reform, construction or recon-
struction of security and justice sector institutions, including oversight and management
bodies (DCAF 2015a; Sedra 2010; Wulf 2011). There remains debate, however, on
whether or not SSR incorporates the justice sector; whether transformation, development
or construction might be more appropriate terms than ‘reform’ given the comprehensive
nature of most reform eﬀorts; whether the principles inherent to SSR – accountability,
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equality, local ownership – are shared or can ever be fully adhered to; andwho are or should
be the main agents of these very reforms (DCAF 2015b; Donais 2018; Sedra 2010). SSR is
usually undertaken by a state alongside national and international partners, with the osten-
sible aim of improving the provision of safety, security and justice to its citizens, in recog-
nition of security being a precursor to long term peace (Andersen 2011; Jackson and
Bakrania 2018). Underpinning SSR is the importance of improving Security Sector Govern-
ance (SSG), ensuring security sector institutions are accountable, aﬀordable, eﬀective and
responsive to the needs of the people (DCAF 2015b).
Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants is often
interrelated with SSR. DDR is fundamentally a process through which armaments are
removed from former combatants, who are also removed from military structures and
assisted in reintegrating into civilian life, and sometimes into state security institutions
(Lamb and Stainer 2018). Both DDR and SSR are highly political exercises with normative
implications, involving the redistribution of power and generally aiming to re-establish the
state’s monopoly of the legitimate use of force. DDR and SSR can also be mutually reinfor-
cing with, for instance, former non-state armed actors being integrated into state security
institutions, which can help rebuild trust between formerly warring parties as well as dis-
incentivise potential spoilers by providing a stake in the state security structures and the
prospects of long-term employment (McFate 2010). Conversely, where DDR falters, due to
resistance, distrust or non-compliance, the prospects for successful SSR are inevitably com-
promised (Knight 2010).
This special issue includes articles which address both SSR and DDR, and the relation-
ship between the two. It does this because SSR and DDR are so integrally related and
because they both fundamentally resonate with the three key issues addressed in this col-
lection. First, the question of norm adoption, contestation and imposition during reform of
the security sector, particularly related to claims for the monopoly of the legitimate use of
force. Second, the multitude of diﬀerent security actors which can lead to multiple pat-
terns of co-operation and contestation within programmes. And third, the consequent
complexity which can compromise programmatic success and, thus, prospects of long-
term peace. The aim of this special issue is to reveal patterns of norm adoption, contesta-
tion and imposition, as well as patterns of co-operation and confrontation between
involved actors of SSR, and how these might impact the extent to which SSR programmes
are eﬀective in meeting their intended objectives of contributing to long-term peace and
stability. In so doing, the articles in this special issue identify ways in which the challenges
resulting from the multiplicity of and tension between norms and actors can be best
addressed. The articles also ask how SSR programmes can be designed and implemented
in environments where there are multiple levels of security arrangements that determine
patterns of security and insecurity. Findings of the studies in this collection will contribute
to previous research on SSR and DDR, as outlined in this introduction, and help inform
practitioners’ considerations on politically-informed SSR programming, particularly exter-
nal actors engaged in reform eﬀorts in societies and cultures outside their own.
Internationally-led SSR programmes are often guided by measures of ‘success’ and
‘failure’ that are deﬁned according to ‘the classical Weberian model of statehood as an
exclusive template’ (Schroeder and Chappuis 2014, 134). This might be helpful for
limited projects that strive for certain benchmarks to evaluate progress. However, it
turns out to be unhelpful when donors insuﬃciently contextualise these templates to
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the needs and wishes of national governments and local communities. Beyond these
generic templates, one obvious way of measuring the impact of SSR programmes is the
absence of direct, physical violence that has been characteristic of the armed conﬂict.
Yet, as Cheng, Goodhand, and Meehan (2018, 26ﬀ.) elaborate, policymakers and prac-
titioners need to disaggregate diﬀerent forms of violence to be best able to address
them: Even if large-scale forms of competitive violence that were persistent throughout
the war have ceased to exist, other forms of violence such as embedded or permissive vio-
lence might still be prevalent and even accepted for the stability of a post-conﬂict country.
Indeed, some forms of violence are sustained across war and peace; where power
relations, structures and norms remain unchanged, violence against women can remain
widely prevalent (Duncanson 2016; Grady 2010). Some forms of violence can increase
after the end of armed conﬂict, such as domestic violence, with peace bringing ‘violence
from the battleﬁeld into the home’ (Call 2007, 392) in part as a result of returning trauma-
tised, male combatants, with little job prospects and ‘resentment at the opportunities and
(usually obligatory) mobility women experienced during wartime’ (Call 2007, 392). Some
new forms of violence can occur in conﬂict-aﬀected environments, where new opportu-
nities and risks arise (such as sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, and traﬃck-
ing and other forms of organised crime (cf. Grady 2010; True 2012). Other forms of violence
become less visible, but no less pernicious, as the focus is on public and often political
forms of violence (Laliberté 2016). Recognising the many forms of violence and other
harms that persist in post-conﬂict environments clearly has an impact on determinants
of success and failure in respect of SSR programmes.
The main assumption of this article, in line with recent research on SSR in post-conﬂict
countries (e.g. Detzner 2017; Donais 2018; Jackson 2018; Sedra 2018), is that there is not a
single template of what the outcome of SSR should look like. Rather, there exist diﬀerent
models of a security sector that are context-speciﬁc and that foster a sense of peace and
order for local communities and that are accessible to all parts of the society. The article
thus links to central debates in the SSR literature in the past years: the need to include
local, non-state actors has been acknowledged and studied (cf. Donais 2018; Furuzawa
2018; Gordon 2014) and there have been multiple analyses of hybrid and integrative
security models (cf. Albrecht 2018; Schroeder, Chappuis, and Kocak 2014). Equally, there
have been attempts by international donors, in part in response to SSR scholarship, to
include into SSR policy and guidelines actors beyond those at the level of the state (e.g.
UN 2014). While the inclusion of local actors and the attention to local norms is uncon-
tested nowadays, this article and the special issue move on to more ﬁne-grained analyses
of the patterns of variations that can occur within this second generation of security sector
reform (cf. Jackson 2018) and that might lead to more or less accepted modes of security
governance and to more or less security for local communities. For example, while largely
locally-driven eﬀorts such as in South Africa in defence, police and intelligence reform (cf.
Africa 2008) might be desirable, a conundrum exists in particular in the most severe
conﬂict cases: due to years of mistrust and violence between former warring parties the
immediate co-operation of former adversaries might not be feasible. Hence, international
actors might have to act as third-party guarantors against a renewed outbreak of violence
and support any eﬀorts to reform the security sector (Walter 2002). Given the ﬁndings of
previous research, this special issue thus asks under what conditions is the ownership of
local actors and the attendance to existing norms more feasible and leads to the creation
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of an accepted and sustainable security sector, and when does it create a fragile peace that
results in a renewed outbreak of violence?
In this collection, we look at examples of where security sector reform has followed the
most severe cases of conﬂict; cases such as East Timor, Uganda, El Salvador, Democratic
Republic of Congo and Nepal. The main actors in SSR eﬀorts in these countries have
been international donors, including the UN and World Bank, which have long dominated
the normative debate about SSR since its beginning in the late 1990s. There have also
been other, bilateral donors which have their own agendas that might diﬀer from the over-
arching framework promoted by UN and World Bank – one might just think about the US
and their overtly military reading of SSR (Albrecht, Stepputat, and Andersen 2010); or the
UK, Germany, Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries who started, in recent years, to
also include, to some extent, civil society and non-state actors into their design and
implementation of SSR programmes (DCAF 2018). South-south cooperation has also
increased in recent years, such as the involvement of the African Union Mission in
Somalia (AMISOM) in providing the training and equipment of Somali security forces
(DCAF 2017). While we acknowledge these eﬀorts, we focus our discussion in this
article, and the articles we introduce in this special issue, on large international donors
that continue to dominate large SSR programmes.
The articles in this special issue connect to current ﬁndings and address three inter-
related aspects which current debates on SSR consider to be fundamental to the extent
to which SSR programmes are eﬀective (e.g. Detzner 2017; Donais 2018; Jackson 2018;
Sedra 2018). Firstly, the variation of norm adoption, contestation and imposition in
post-conﬂict countries. Secondly, the multitude of diﬀerent actors engaged in reform
eﬀorts beyond the level of the state that might lead to multiple patterns of contestation
and co-operation between actors. Finally, how both the multiplicity of and tension
between norms and actors further complicates eﬀorts to build peace. These three
aspects have the potential to signiﬁcantly impact how security sector institutions are
developed, as well as regarded and accepted by local communities and, consequently,
the extent to which these institutions are eﬀective and sustainable.
This introduction brieﬂy draws from the application of complexity theory to peacebuild-
ing (de Coning 2018) to underscore how problematic it can be to inﬂuence social systems
– particularly post-conﬂict social systems – which are already complex, dynamic and non-
linear. Complexity theory has been applied to peacebuilding (de Coning 2018) but, as yet,
not speciﬁcally to the study of SSR and DDR. Drawing from complexity theory, and the
insights in the articles in this collection, we can see how proliferation of and contestation
between actors, and between their normative positions, may question assumptions of
‘success’ and ‘failure’ of international donors when designing and implementing SSR
and DDR programmes.
In introducing this special issue on ‘Co-operation, Contestation and Complexity in Post-
Conﬂict Security Sector Reform’, this article provides a critical overview of existing research
on fundamental aspects in the study of SSR. It also provides the framework for the articles
and presents the conceptual narrative of the special issue. This introductory article begins
by discussing the conceptual-contextual divide in SSR programmes (Chanaa 2002; Jackson
and Bakrania 2018; Podder 2013), focussing speciﬁcally on the continued state-centred
focus of SSR (Jackson 2018; Jackson and Bakrania 2018; Sedra 2018), and situates the
debates within the wider ﬁeld of critical peacebuilding. It then moves on to a discussion
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of the role of norm diﬀusion – including imposition, contestation, and adaption – in SSR,
DDR and broader peacebuilding eﬀorts. As norms are created, changed, and contested
by actors, we will then move on to a discussion of the role of diﬀerent actors engaged in
SSR and DDR, before we conclude with a discussion of the complexity and political dimen-
sions of SSR and its implications for the establishment of peace in conﬂict-aﬀected
environments.
SSR’s normative agenda
The ostensible aims of internationally-led SSR, at least in established policy guidance
(OECD 2007, 2005; UN 2014), are deeply normative in character and oriented at an ideal
type of Weberian state (Schroeder and Chappuis 2014). They usually include helping
the central state achieve a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, democratic oversight
over the security sector, the protection of human rights, and transparent and accountable
processes. In practice, internationally-led SSR programmes oftentimes side-line the norma-
tive agenda in favour of expediency, cost and clarity: oversight bodies – and broader
eﬀorts to promote governance, accountability and transparency – often receive less atten-
tion and less resources than the core security sector institutions they are to hold accoun-
table (Jackson 2018; Sedra 2018); human rights and gender equality are often reduced to a
day’s awareness training or a footnote in a report (Ansorg and Haastrup 2018). The state-
centred focus of SSR as contained in these core texts, however, continues to inform prac-
tice. Indeed, as Jackson (2018, 2) argues, a focus on state eﬀectiveness and technical train-
and-equip programmes have tended to eclipse ‘the strong normative agenda of democ-
racy and human rights’.
Despite recurrent criticism of the state-centred nature of SSR, the prevailing focus of
many externally-driven SSR programmes on building the capacity and eﬀectiveness of
state institutions suggests that SSR remains central to the statebuilding exercise, which con-
tinues to remain central to peacebuilding (Jackson 2011). Broadly speaking, the threat of the
non-state to many countries, speciﬁcally in the post-9/11 world, has reaﬃrmed the impor-
tance of a strong state (Duﬃeld 2007), and particularly building the capacity of the security
sector as ‘the deﬁning element ofmodern statehood’ (Benedix and Stanley 2008, 97). Inter-
nationally-led SSR programmes, thus, continue to focus on state institutions – reforming,
constructing or reconstructing them, building their capacity, training and equipping their
staﬀ, amending or drafting legislative and policy frameworks to facilitate their work, creat-
ing structures to co-ordinate and enhance their eﬀorts (Baker and Scheye 2007; Gordon
2014; Jackson 2011). In recent years there have been some eﬀorts on the part of inter-
national actors engaged in SSR to support and build the capacity of non-state security
and justice providers and promote a hybrid approach to SSR (Commission 2016; DCAF
2018). Nonetheless, in many internationally-led SSR programmes there continues to be
little eﬀort to look beyond the level of the state, at the relationship between the state
and its people, or how local-level agency impacts SSR (Andersen 2012; Ansorg 2017;
Donais and Knorr 2013; Jackson 2010, 2011, 2018). This is despite SSR literature underscor-
ing the importance of public support and conﬁdence in the state, which lends the state
legitimacy, which is critical to state eﬀectiveness (Jackson 2010) and SSR literature advocat-
ing for the integration of a social contract perspective to SSR (Knight 2009).
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The state-centred focus of SSR may come of no surprise to civil servants and policy-
makers; after all, it is state actors and international organisations consisting of states
who promote this view. Yet, what might be seen as ideal in international organisations
or leading donor countries, may not in non-OECD countries from the Global South.
African-driven SSR eﬀorts have only materialised in recent years with the ‘African Union
Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform’ (African Union Commission 2014) and
attempts to develop an ECOWAS framework on SSR (Ebo 2007). However, the debate
on the concepts and content of SSR programmes continues to be driven by international
donors such as UN or World Bank, which often take the lead in SSR programmes in
countries as diverse as Liberia (Malan 2008), DR Congo (Mobekk 2009), or Kosovo
(Lemay-Hébert 2013). The neoliberal peacebuilding project which continues to place
the state at the centre of peacebuilding endeavours, and enshrines within it all prospects
of long-term peace, serves to reinforce dominant power relations; marginalising the non-
state and, with it, prospects of peace that might be more meaningful to all beyond domi-
nant and elite groups (Donais 2018; Jackson 2010, 2011, 2018). Moreover, power relations
on the international stage are also reinforced through reiﬁcation of the state. Indeed, neo-
liberal peacebuilding may be regarded as part of colonialist endeavours; strengthening
the state but only as a reﬂection of how states look and what states do in the Global
North, with little consideration given to local context beyond the national level (Ansorg
and Kurtenbach 2017; Chandler 2000; Duﬃeld 2007; Richmond 2006). Unsurprisingly, pol-
itical elites of target states might themselves apply the donor-centred language of
capacity and state-building, often driven by the desire to increase rents and economic
opportunities as part of the political bargaining in the immediate post-conﬂict period
(Cheng, Goodhand, and Meehan 2018). And, of course, political elites of target states
also have a vested interest in maintaining power rather than divesting it to a wide
variety of non-state actors (Donais 2017).
The irony remains, of course, that there isn’t a singular vision of what works in terms of
security sectors. Moreover, even the realities of security sectors in developed countries are
far away from this ideal the donor agencies would like to see promoted in conﬂict-aﬀected
contexts. In the US, for example, the police is highly racially biased, to the point that ‘the
probability of being {black, unarmed, and shot by police} is about 3.49 times the prob-
ability of being {white, unarmed, and shot by police} on average’ (Ross 2015, n.p.). Insti-
tutional racism continues to be a problem of the British judiciary: the Lammy review, a
recent independent review into the treatment of, and outcomes for Black, Asian and Min-
ority Ethnic individuals in the criminal justice system, led by David Lammy, MP, shows that
BAME individuals still face bias, including overt discrimination, in parts of the British justice
system (Lammy Review 2017). And a UN panel concluded that German security and gov-
ernment agencies discriminate against people of African descent, allowing for widespread
institutional racism (OHCHR 2017). Donors, thus, have to reﬂect on and discuss diﬀerent
normative avenues of promoting the reform of security sector abroad, while at the
same time acknowledging that there is not an exclusive template of statehood and SSR
in a post-conﬂict country.
The fact that state-centred SSR programmes continue to dominate despite a widely-
acknowledged mixed record of success further underscores the irony (Jackson 2018;
Jackson and Bakrania 2018; Sedra 2018). Even in examples generally considered to be ‘suc-
cessful’ (cf. Detzner 2017), there have been aspects which have had sub-optimal or
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counterproductive outcomes. In Sierra Leone, for example, a heavy externally-driven
process facilitated decentralisation, including in the area of security, contributed to
peace at the local level but failed to aﬀect power dynamics between local chiefs and
national political elites which poses a potentially greater threat to a more devolved
form of governance (Nickson and Cutting 2016). The same can be said of DDR pro-
grammes, with a mixed record of success including within individual programmes gener-
ally considered to have met agreed outcomes. For instance, the DDR process in
Mozambique and subsequent peacebuilding throughout the early 1990s is generally con-
sidered to have been thorough and eﬀective (Sabaratnam 2017, 9). Yet, a recent outbreak
of violence after the elections in 2014 reveals a lack of eﬀective post-war justice mechan-
isms and resentment particularly among previous members of RENAMO (Resistência
Nacional Moçambicana) regarding the perceived lack of representation (Sabaratnam
2017, 9). This shows that large-scale competitive violence has deceased, but the causes
of conﬂict are not tackled suﬃciently, so that the risk of renewed outbreak of violence
remains.
Despite these mixed results and the afore-mentioned paradoxes, the agenda of inter-
national donors and the state-centric approaches in their programmes continue to be
driven by normative aims that only marginally relate to speciﬁc contexts on the ground.
There have been missed opportunities to improve the record of SSR through thorough
investigation and understanding why sub-optimal results have occurred despite best
eﬀorts and investment of signiﬁcant resources (cf. Denney and Valters 2015). In these inter-
nationally-led programmes, there have been similar missed opportunities to build upon
eﬀective SSR practices, as a result of limited evaluation – or engagement with exiting
evaluations and analysis – as well as translation and application of models without
suﬃcient context analysis (Germann 2002; Jackson and Bakrania 2018; Schroeder 2010;
Sedra 2017, 2018). With this special issue, we aim to contribute to understanding the
varied patterns of norm adoption and diﬀerent levels of inclusion of local actors that
might lead to the mixed results of SSR programmes.
Contesting, adopting and adapting norms on SSR
As outlined above, international and national concepts and guidelines of security sector
reform continue to be driven by a normative agenda focused on human rights, rule of
law, good governance, and democratic values. Yet, previous research has shown that
these guiding norms of SSR agendas are only marginally implemented in practice.
Already in 2002, Chanaa revealed a ‘conceptual-contextual divide’ between SSR frame-
works and the contextual realities in conﬂict-aﬀected countries. This idea has been evi-
denced by numerous case studies on major SSR programmes in the past ﬁfteen years:
Findings from a few over-studied cases – including Sierra Leone (e.g. Albrecht and
Jackson 2014a, 2014b), Liberia (e.g. Podder 2013), Kosovo (e.g. Holohan 2016; Lemay-
Hébert 2013), Bosnia and Herzegovina (Klopfer et al. 2012; Marijan 2017), Afghanistan
(Ayub, Kouvo, and Wareham 2009; Sedra 2014, 2007), or Iraq (Rathmell 2005; Sedra
2007) – have shown that SSR in practice is often a technical exercise that focuses on build-
ing the capacity of security sector institutions, but lacks co-ordinated and comprehensive
eﬀorts to develop local institutions that are accepted by the population, resulting in a clear
gap between policy and practice (Albrecht and Jackson 2014a; Gordon 2014; Jackson
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2018; Sedra 2018). Short-term stability is then often prioritised over the long-term devel-
opment of institutions, often only marginally attending to the conceptually prioritised
norms.
The normative critique in the SSR literature can be linked to a wider debate on chal-
lenges in statebuilding and peacebuilding that engages in a comprehensive critique of
the international peacebuilding agenda and calls for a better inclusion and recognition
of the agency of local populations in post-conﬂict peacebuilding endeavours. In particular,
scholars from the critical peacebuilding school such as Richmond (2011), Mac Ginty (2010),
Heathershaw (2008), and Paﬀenholz (2010) have pointed out the importance of greater
inclusion of civil society, local authorities and other actors beyond the level of the state,
and the potential of hybrid governance systems for long-term peace and stability.
There are two aspects that are of importance here. On the one hand, internationally-
driven SSR programmes are often guided by a very speciﬁc normative framework that
comes with the above mentioned ‘classical Weberian model of statehood as an exclusive
template’ (Schroeder and Chappuis 2014, 134) for the security sector. On the other hand,
in practice, the implementation of these normative guidelines at times falls victim to expe-
diency, cost and clarity (Jackson 2018; Sedra 2018). As a consequence, speciﬁc local con-
texts and existing security norms are often neglected in the process of both the design and
implementation internationally-driven SSR programmes.
In terms of SSR scholarship, some questions continue to remain unanswered in particu-
lar from a post-colonial critique of persistent Eurocentric concepts. For instance, given the
assumption that SSR concepts and programmes come with certain normative assumptions
regarding democracy, rule of law and human rights, what is the context under which
norms get side-lined in the dynamic and non-linear environment of post-conﬂict
countries, and when are they maintained as guiding principles? If they are maintained
within a SSR programme, what are the patterns under which these norms get imposed,
adopted, adapted, contested? Under which circumstances is it more likely that conﬂict-
aﬀected areas will adopt democratic norms, and when is there resistance towards
certain aspects? What implications does this have for the states emerging from conﬂict?
What are the consequences of these developments for people who suﬀer insecurity,
and for those responsible for managing or establishing security?
States vary in their adoption of the normative goals of SSR. As indicated by previous
research, in some cases domestic actors enhance their security capacities through external
training or infrastructural assistance, ‘but without implementing overarching norms and
rules to govern the use of force’ (Schroeder, Chappuis, and Kocak 2014, 218). In other
cases, domestic actors nominally institutionalise speciﬁc norms, ‘but fail to implement
appropriate organizational structures and capacities’ (Schroeder, Chappuis, and Kocak
2014, 218).
The most obvious and most discussed pattern of norm diﬀusion is probably the one of
imposition of norms, which is widely debated in the literature on critical peacebuilding.
The idea of norm imposition lies at the very heart of critiques of peacebuilding and SSR
programmes as neoliberal and at times neo-colonial endeavour of international actors
(Chandler 2006; Lemay-Hébert 2013). Particularly in cases where international actors
take on a more directive role, for example in the DRC,1 some norms are rather imposed
or coerced onto the society of the target state, often without much attention towards
local realities on the ground – or the ‘context’ in which SSR might be implemented
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(see Chanaa 2002). In addition, recipients of SSR reform in post-conﬂict countries often
experience the processes of norm diﬀusion as ‘heavily shaped by memories of colonialism
and exploitation’ (Baaz and Stern 2017, 208), thus perpetuating neo-colonial structures by
way of SSR missions. The states that evolve out of these programmes are then often only
fragile constructs of an idea of a liberal state, with elections, organisations such as the
police, governments, or political parties, but without being established or even accepted
by the local population: ‘In reality, what external agents do is set up organizations, not
institutions’ (Ottaway 2002, 1004). These organisations, however, often do not provide
rules and procedures that correspond with the reality of relevant actors on the ground.
But patterns of norm diﬀusion at times go beyond a mere imposition; norms might be
adopted and subsequently adapted by national governments or non-state actors, or an
imposition of norms might be contested. Such patterns in a post-conﬂict context might
be informed by debates on similar topics in other areas of International Relations. For
example, in his works about norm localisation and institutional change in Asian regional-
ism, Acharya (2004) discusses the idea of ‘localisation’ of foreign norms into local norms
and traditions. Achrya deﬁnes ‘localisation’ as ‘the active construction (through discourse,
framing, grafting, and cultural selection) of foreign ideas by local actors, which results in
the former developing signiﬁcant congruence with local beliefs and practice’ (Acharya
2004, 245). Eventually, ideas and norms need to be accepted by the local population.
This entails that local norms are not replaced, but foreign norms are adapted to ﬁt local
beliefs and practices, thus creating resonance. A similar argument is made by Checkel
when analysing the inﬂuence the European human rights regime has on domestic politics
in Germany (Checkel 1999). His focus lies on local ‘norm-takers’ (Checkel 1999, 91) such as
local elites, who voluntarily incorporate foreign ideas into local norms and traditions.
Drawing on assumptions from social psychology for her research on nuclear non-pro-
liferation, Rublee (2008; 2009) points towards the importance of ‘norm entrepreneurs’ for
the appropriation of norms. She ﬁnds that the potency of norm transmission is inﬂuenced
by three conditions (Rublee 2008, 429f.): ﬁrst, uncertainty about a task or the outcome of a
social process, which makes actors more likely to accept outside inﬂuence; second, the
similarity to the norm transmitter, which also contributes to a higher acceptance of
outside inﬂuence; and third, intergroup conﬂict of the aﬀected society, which diminishes
eﬀorts of co-operation and inﬂuence on norms. There is, perhaps, a further dynamic at play
worth commenting on; those norms being transmitted or imposed are not internalised by
norm transmitters. This leads to issues of credibility and legitimacy, with the potency of
norm transmission being inﬂuenced by the extent to which the gap between policy
and practice is evident or can be exploited by those in the aﬀected society.
While patterns of ‘localisation’ by ‘norm entrepreneurs’ or ‘norm-takers’ can also be
found in the post-conﬂict context, it is particularly the contested aspect of norm
diﬀusion that is under-studied. On the one hand, we can expect that international
norms on SSR are adapted in those cases where national government or local, non-
state actors such as local self-defence groups see them align with their own cultural
belief systems or beneﬁcial to their own objectives – one example being the local
chiefs in Sierra Leone mentioned above, who saw the decentralisation reforms quite
ﬁtting for a retention of local power dynamics (according to Nickson and Cutting 2016;
it is worth noting that other scholars view the impact of decentralisation upon the
power of chiefs less positively – cf. Albrecht, Stepputat, and Andersen 2010). And in
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times of high uncertainty, after armed conﬂict has ended and post-conﬂict order will be re-
established, we might assume a higher acceptance of outside actors to the ﬁeld, as
suggested by Rublee (2008, 430). Given the enormity of the task of reconstructing or
reforming the security and justice sector in some cases, and given the concept of SSR
may be new to some, it can be further anticipated that SSR norms may be accepted by
national governments or local actors, and others may be rejected.
However, this does not appear to be the case in practice very often. This can be, in part,
explained by the thesis that SSR norms are less likely to be appropriated when they conﬂict
with or are dissimilar to local norms (Rublee 2008, 430). This is of particular importance for
inﬂuence of international donors and SSR actors such as UN and World Bank, who have
very diﬀerent normative legacies and follow a very diﬀerent norm system from the
post-conﬂict countries they are active in. Furthermore, drawing from Rublee’s theoretical
assumptions, where post-conﬂict environments are often characterised by internal div-
isions, it can be expected that external eﬀorts to inﬂuence norms will be unsuccessful
(Rublee 2008, 429f.). Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of conﬂict, where power is shift-
ing and local actors are vying for control, it can be expected that local actors will be less
likely to accept external norms, especially those that may limit the power of elites, as SSR
norms generally do. On the other hand, in such a context, local actors may express amen-
ability to external norms as a means of generating partnerships with inﬂuential external
actors that can gain them political leverage and even help consolidate their power. There-
after, norm adoption may be a slow process of negotiation, adaption and/or resistance by
a myriad of diﬀerent local actors engaged in or inﬂuential over SSR, its planning, its
implementation and its outcomes.
The articles in this special issue shed light on these aspects of norm imposition, adop-
tion, adaption, and contestation. They discuss aspects of diverging historical legacies that
have an impact on the contestation of internationally promoted SSR norms (Kocak 2018);
the adaption of international models on community-policing for political purposes (Kagoro
2018); and the interaction between diﬀerent normative areas of SSR and the judiciary
(Kurtenbach 2018).
Kocak’s article traces the legacies and variances of ‘community-based policing’ in
Timor-Leste and analyses in detail its historical roots and cross-cultural socio-political inﬂu-
ences. In particular, the article explores the historical reasons for a failure of the commu-
nity-based policing approach promoted by the United Nations Transitional Administration
(UNTAET). Drawing on diﬀusion theory, Kocak shows that policing in Timor-Leste evolved
by way of a transfer of historical norms of policing from Japan to Indonesia and, with the
Indonesian occupation, onwards to Timor-Leste. However, when the UN tried to
implement their normative blueprint of community policing in Timor-Leste, they did
not take into account prevailing modes of policing. This eventually led to a normative
conﬂict in respect of diverging ideas about policing, which was discharged in the
violent encounters between citizen, police, and military. Kocak’s article shows the impor-
tance of international peace missions engaged in SSR attending to existing norms on the
ground – and for research to take historical dynamics and processes into account when
explaining contemporary challenges in the thematic ﬁeld of security governance. The
article thus makes an important contribution to existing literature about more holistic per-
spectives of security governance that take into account inﬂuences from various
backgrounds.
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Community policing is also the topic of Kagoro’s article (2018). Through an ethnographic
lens, the article analyses the eﬀects of Ugandan local community policing initiatives on the
country’s security architecture. Because the Ugandan police has long been instrumenta-
lised by its authoritarian regimes, community policing was seen – in the speciﬁc
Ugandan context – as path-breaking and novel by external donors such as the UK to
bring the police closer to the people. In his research, Kagoro found that while community
policing is somewhat appreciated and used by citizens, the scheme operates in a legal
ambiguity: it has sometimes led to civilians taking over police duties, and has been routinely
politicised in regime security strategies. Community policing might thus be acclaimed by
development partners as best practice to closer connect police to the local communities.
Yet, with little regard for the actual context, it might result in normative conﬂicts, further
entrenching elite power and removing the provision of security from those most in need.
Using a framework of political policing, Kagoro shows that, while publicly serving the
idea of democratically-driven police work, community policing is in fact a tool of the
regime for its own survival. This is particularly the case during times of potential political
instability, such as around elections. Similar to Kocak’s observations, Kagoro’s research
shows that a norm that is brought to a country from abroad might turn out very
diﬀerent in everyday life, depending on the level of adaption and change by local actors.
The interaction between the security context and the normative assumptions of SSR is
also pointed out by Kurtenbach (2018). Drawing on the assumptions of historical institu-
tionalism, Kurtenbach shows that the tendency to overlook justice system reform in the
context of SSR and wider peacebuilding eﬀorts has serious consequences for the quality
and sustainability of peace. The case study of El Salvador highlights that even though
the country is often praised as a showcase of liberal peacebuilding, peace should mean
more than the absence of war. The persistent high levels of violence in El Salvador are
closely linked to a lack of comprehensive reforms in the justice system. In particular, the
political elites of the country, with their sweeping Amnesty Law that was not included in
the peace agreement of 1992, paved the way for impunity for the major human rights vio-
lations that were committed throughout the 1980–1992 civil war. Necessary reforms in the
security and justice sectors were undermined by social coalitions between political elites in
El Salvador; Kurtenbach’s article underscores the impact that powerful elite groups can
have on reform eﬀorts. The eﬀects of limited justice sector reform, however, persist, with
continued impunity for human rights violations. As Kurtenbach’s research highlights, the
immediate aftermath of armed conﬂict provides an opportunity to institute reforms; if
eﬀorts to reform the justice sector and inculcate a culture of accountability do not begin
swiftly, it can be very diﬃcult later on to dismantle a culture of impunity.
With case studies from diﬀerent parts of the world, the articles demonstrate that, due to
speciﬁc context and idiosyncrasies, there is no international normative assumption on SSR
that might ever be implemented as envisaged by international donors. In all cases, inter-
nationally accepted norms of SSR have been imposed, contested, adapted and changed
according to the local speciﬁcities and needs. With any attempt of norm diﬀusion, it is
thus important to adopt a more holistic approach and account for historical, cultural
and socio-political legacies, which are decisive for the outcome of norm appropriation.
The contributions also stress the importance to focus on those who produce and experi-
ence security on a local level as the actual agents of SSR and actors of the related norm
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diﬀusion – which ties in with the anti-colonial readings of critical peacebuilding and sta-
tebuilding literature mentioned above (cf. Sabaratnam 2017, 19ﬀ.).
As is already evident, the role of local actors at the state and sub-state level in conﬂict-
aﬀected environments, and their relationship with external or international actors is, of
course, critical, in the process of norm appropriation. The next section will take a closer
look at the relationship between these various actors and how co-operation and contesta-
tion can impact the implementation of SSR programmes and the extent to which their
intended objectives are achieved.
A myriad of actors
As outlined above, internationally-led SSR programmes continue to be informed by
Weberian notions of the state, which is very much a Western construct, in which the
state claims a monopoly of the legitimate use of force, and thus tend to be focused
upon the (re-)establishment of organised and legitimate state force as an answer to
conﬂict-torn societies (Mannitz 2014). While the principle of local ownership and
context speciﬁcity are enshrined in policy (OECD 2005, 2007; UN 2014), the ‘classical
Weberian model of statehood’ (Schroeder and Chappuis 2014, 134) still prevails and fre-
quently fails to see the reality that is so evident in many post-conﬂict states: particularly in
African, Asian, and Latin American states, state security institutions are only one of a plur-
ality of actors that provide security and justice to its citizens (Baker 2010; Jackson 2018;
Jackson and Bakrania 2018; Sedra 2018). In many countries, the vast majority of the popu-
lation accesses security and justice through informal or non-state providers, or customary
or traditional security and justice systems, with 80% to 90% of people in the Global South
accessing security or justice through informal providers according to some estimates
(Albrecht and Kyed 2011; Baker 2010). This is particularly the case in conﬂict-aﬀected
and developing countries (see Baker 2010; Baker and Scheye 2007) and particularly
where state institutions lack capacity or credibility, or access to them is problematic.
The urban poor and people in rural areas are particularly likely to access informal security
and justice mechanisms; again, generally reﬂective of the fact that state institutions do not
or cannot adequately respond to the needs of the people, particularly those at the margins
of society.
However, while there are some examples of inclusion of non-state providers into secur-
ity models, as mentioned above, many internationally-funded SSR programmes continue
to focus on building the eﬀectiveness of state institutions, often neglecting non-state
security actors like traditional justice and security mechanisms or self-defence groups.
Critical research now widely acknowledges that state-centric SSR approaches fail to take
into account the diversity of formal and informal security actors that exist in places
where programmes are implemented (Baker 2010; Donais 2017; Gordon 2014). It is impor-
tant to note that eﬀorts to engage non-state providers into security models and non-state
actors into reform programmes are limited for many reasons. Aside from the fact that there
may be concern about capacity, knowledge, legitimacy and adherence to international
standards or norms – or at least likely acceptance of intended outputs of external
donors and other actors (Sedra 2010), engaging non-state actors requires more resources,
due to the increased number and type of actors and resultant complexity (Gordon 2014).
Additionally, such eﬀorts can take longer to deliver outputs, particularly where there are
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many diﬀerent actors and approaches to providing security. This is problematic where
donors need to demonstrate results in short timeframes (Oosterveld and Galand 2012)
and the security risks prevalent in environments in the immediate aftermath of conﬂict
require urgent attention (Stabilisation Unit 2014). With increased number and type of
actors, consensus on the way forward can be hard to reach and can, thus, potentially com-
promise eﬀorts. The costs and risks associated with engaging non-state providers into
security models and non-state actors into reform programmes, therefore, tend to result
in limiting the scope of actors engaged in and addressed by reform programmes. Of
course, it is not only international actors engaged in SSR programmes who have a
vested interest in limiting the scope of actors engaged in or addressed within reform pro-
grammes. State actors within conﬂict-aﬀected societies may also be inclined to limit the
number of actors engaged in SSR for fear of relinquishing power, given SSR is fundamen-
tally about renegotiating and redistributing power and can signiﬁcantly limit the power of
elites (Heupel 2012); engaging non-state actors, those who have the most to gain from a
redistribution of power, may therefore be resisted. Non-state actors might also have no
interest in engaging in externally-driven reform programmes, particularly if they distrust
external actors (Narten 2008). These explanations tend to assume, however, that
eﬀective and responsive security and justice sector institutions, which enjoy broad-
based public conﬁdence and trust, can be built without engaging a broad cross-section
of those whom such institutions are meant to serve and without acknowledging how
they currently access justice and security.
Policy discourse acknowledges the need to incorporate perspectives from the Global
South (e.g. UN 2014), yet it often falls short on describing how in detail this can be
done in a volatile and dynamic post-conﬂict environment. Even in SSR scholarship,
there is signiﬁcant literature which argues for incorporating non-state actors (both
within and beyond the security sector) in SSR programmes (Baker 2010; Derks 2012;
Gordon 2014; Jackson 2010; Jackson 2011; Price and Warren 2017), while very little
describes ways in which this can be successfully done beyond identifying the opportu-
nities and challenges that exist. Outside academic literature, the work of the Geneva
Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) in Geneva and the Centre
for Security Governance (CSG) in Ontario are particularly notable exceptions.
In practice, informal or traditional security and justice mechanisms continue to be over-
looked. Burian (2017) notes, for instance, that while there is signiﬁcant investment in SSR
across Mali, Nigeria, Liberia and Guinea Bissau, there is only one example across all of these
countries of a programme working with non-state actors. This is often because of security,
logistical, ﬁnancial, political and epistemological concerns. There may be security and
logistical challenges which problematise access. It is also often easier for international
actors engaged in SSR programmes to engage state representatives who are more familiar,
more reachable and who may also share similar views or speak the same language
(Mobekk 2010; Sedra 2010). There may be a level of fear, or suspicion of informal security
and justice providers, or disregard of any expertise or legitimacy they are considered to
have (Donais 2009). International actors also often assume that it is quicker and cheaper
to engage with actors and institutions at the state-level, rather than extend the type
and number of co-ordination mechanisms with a plethora of other actors across the
country or region. It may be perceived as harder to control outcomes if the number of
actors engaged expands, particularly if those actors do not share similar views, cultures
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or experience. Where outcomes need to be predictable and swift or may otherwise poten-
tially compromise peacebuilding, engagement with those beyond the state-level may be
limited. Of course, many of these challenges exist. Informal security and justice mechan-
isms can also be unaccountable, corrupt and discriminatory, particularly against women
and marginalised groups, reinforcing social structures and exclusion and perpetuating
human rights violations (Jackson 2010, 2011). The same is, of course, true for state insti-
tutions (see Denney and Domingo 2013). Without romanticising the local (Mac Ginty
2015; Richmond 2011), informal security and justice mechanisms can be more responsive
to the needs of people, cheaper, quicker, fairer, more understandable and, as such, can
contribute signiﬁcantly to providing access to justice, particularly to the poorer and
more vulnerable members of society. Ignoring informal security and justice mechanisms,
therefore, undermines prospects for building security and justice and, consequently, pro-
spects for long-term peace.
This is not to argue that informal security and justice providers should necessarily be
formally incorporated into SSR programmes, as this can compromise their value, legiti-
macy and the public trust and conﬁdence they might enjoy. But their role in providing
security and justice needs to be acknowledged, and not undermined by building or
strengthening processes, policies and institutions that may harm their eﬀectiveness
(Gordon 2014) or turn them into ‘spoilers’ (Meharg and Arnusch 2010).
Besides the multitude of actors, including non-state actors, in the post-conﬂict country
itself, there might also be multiple international donors. Often it is assumed that they
follow the same state-centric norms and have the same goals. However, their aims, in par-
ticular in regards to peace, justice or security, may well diﬀer – and their approaches to SSR
are often informed by what works in their own country or what may be a favourable
outcome for their own geopolitical strategies. Thus, tension can arise during SSR planning
and can result in challenges during and after implementation, particularly if diﬀerent
countries have led on reforming diﬀerent aspects of the security sector. In Afghanistan,
for instance, following the 2011 Bonn Agreement, the US led on defence reform,
Germany on police reform, Italy on judicial reform, UK on counter-narcotics, and Japan
on DDR before NATO assumed responsibility for training Afghan National Security
Forces (ANSF) (DCAF 2015a). This posed challenges for co-ordination and, ultimately,
implementation given the diﬀerent sectors within the broader security sector are interde-
pendent and changes in one inevitably aﬀect another (DCAF 2015b). In Kosovo, before the
Unilateral Declaration of Independence, the many countries involved in preliminary dis-
cussions regarding future security structures advocated diﬀerent structures based upon
their own experience as well as their geopolitical interests. This resulted in prolonged dis-
cussions on the merits of diﬀerent types of security sector institutions (such as a gendarm-
erie, security force, civilian-led quasi-Defence Ministry) and tension between the various
international actors, rather than a focus on security needs (which would determine the
type of structures and capacity required) and relations with local actors (author’s engage-
ment in the UN in Kosovo 2004–2008). As Knight’s (2010) research on linkages between
SSR and DDR in post-conﬂict African countries, suspicion between national actor and
poor co-ordination between external actors can compromise success, as a result of non-
compliance or delays in implementation, gaps or duplication of eﬀort and subsequent
deﬁciencies and confusion, wasted resources, and competition between actors rather
than focus on shared goals. Likewise, Lamb and Stainer (2018) underscore the importance
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of co-ordination between various stakeholders engaged in DDR, drawing from the example
of South Sudan, to avoid misunderstandings, inter-organisational tensions, rivalries and mis-
trust between stakeholders and the subsequent impact these can have on implementation
and outcomes. As DDR and SSR incorporate increasing numbers and type of actors – includ-
ing civil society actors, private sector companies, regional organisations – co-ordination
eﬀorts are further problematised (Lamb and Stainer 2018; Paris 2009).
Articles in this special issue address ways in which diﬀerent actors or stakeholders
engaged in SSR and DDR may compete or co-operate, and how their normative assump-
tions may collide and, consequently, further complicate planning and implementation of
programmes. The contributions pay particular attention to the relationship between state
and non-state actors: assumptions about who has the necessary skills, knowledge and
aptitude to work in the security sector or engage in SSR, which tends to marginalise
those not perceived to be part of the formal security sector as well as privilege those con-
sidered to be representative or constitutive of the state (Gordon 2018); the integration of
combatants from non-state armed groups after conﬂict into state armed forces (Bussmann
2018 and Gordon 2018); the impact certain non-state (and state) actors can have on under-
mining prospects for programmatic success (Ansorg and Strasheim 2018); as well as the
role of local communities in community policing schemes (Kagoro 2018 and Kocak 2018).
Gordon’s (2018) article reﬂects upon the continued marginalisation of women in SSR,
particularly defence reform, despite the fact that gender-responsive SSR is increasingly
recognised as being key to success. Gordon investigates reasons for women’s marginali-
sation, focussing particularly on attitudes towards women in the defence sector and
assumptions about a woman’s place and her skillsets, aptitude and interests. By analysing
developments in Nepal, Sri Lanka, Kosovo and Colombia, Gordon explores the paradox of
women’s marginalisation in defence reform and post-reform defence structures, in places
where women were active combatants in large numbers during the preceding conﬂict.
Gordon adopts a feminist institutionalist approach to show how SSR helps security
sector institutions construct and reconstruct gender power relations, reinforce gendered
dynamics of exclusion, and determine gendered outcomes. Gordon argues that gender-
responsive defence reform that moves beyond simply adding women has the potential
to inﬂuence gendered assumptions women’s and men’s place and skillsets, and thereby
alter gender power relations within and beyond the defence sector, and, with it, enhance
the security of women and build more sustainable peace.
Bussmann’s (2018) article also looks at DDR and defence reform, speciﬁcally the inte-
gration of former combatants from insurgent or non-state armed groups into state
armed forces after conﬂict. While Gordon’s article helps to ﬁll a gap in the literature on
the gender dynamics of SSR, DDR and the links between the two, Bussmann’s article con-
tributes to addressing the gap in the literature on the modalities of military integration as
part of DDR processes. Bussmann discusses how military power sharing through the inte-
gration of both or several conﬂict parties in post-conﬂict security sector institutions can
respond to the challenge of demobilising combatants from non-state armed groups
who may not want to relinquish their status or control or who may lack conﬁdence or
trust in the government and its security forces. Drawing on assumptions from bargaining
literature and empirical analysis of 77 post-conﬂict countries between 1989 and 2013,
Bussmann argues that military integration of rebel ﬁghters in the national armed forces
can be a strong signal of the conﬂict parties’ commitment to the peace process and
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can contribute to building a stable peace. Bussmann also shows that civil war is more likely
to recur if forces of former warring parties such as rebel groups are retained during the
military integration process. This is, perhaps, unsurprising, given maintenance of rebel
forces is a clear indication of lack of faith in the peacebuilding process, and a strong
signal that there are other factors which undermine prospects for long-term peace. This
also would seem to reaﬃrm the importance in peacebuilding of the state being able to
claim a monopoly of the legitimate use of force. Additionally, Bussmann’s analysis
shows that civil war is more likely to recur if the military plays an important role in the
post-conﬂict economy, including a larger proportion of the labour market comprising
the military.
Ansorg and Strasheim’s (2018) article also considers how the presence of certain actors
can undermine prospects for successful peacebuilding. Speciﬁcally, they consider the role
of so-called veto players – a term drawn from game theory, meaning actors who have
suﬃcient power to stop a proposed or planned action – and their impact on DDR pro-
grammes. In so doing they contribute to the literature on DDR by investigating the
precise factors that lead to successful DDR. By looking at Nepal and the Democratic Repub-
lic of Congo (DRC), Ansorg and Strasheim show that the likelihood of successfully imple-
menting post-conﬂict DDR programmes decreases as the number of veto players
increases. So, in Nepal, the small number of veto players helped the implementation of
DDR, although other factors of course compromised full success (not least that former
combatants left cantonments only in 2012 when the civil war had ended 6 years previously
– see Bhandari 2015). In contrast, whereas the high number of veto players from within
and outside DRC posed a particular challenge to the implementation of the DDR pro-
gramme, ultimately leading to diﬃculties in integrating all players and demobilising the
high number of diverse groups.
Ansorg and Strasheim also argue that the policy distance between veto players and lack
of internal cohesion of veto players does not negatively impact DDR implementation. This
is a signiﬁcant ﬁnding which runs counter to intuitive assumptions about ethnic cleavages
and fractionalisation as being critical risk factors in DDR programmes. Ansorg and Strasheim
highlight the deﬁcits in veto player theory when applied to the dynamic and challenging
context of post-conﬂict environments, but their ﬁndings are an important contribution to
the literature on DDR.
Other articles in this special issue demonstrate how the speciﬁc actors, and the multi-
plicity of actors, can problematise SSR programmes. For example, the article by Kocak
(2018) points to the diﬃculties of co-operation between several international and local
actors. Although on paper the UN Transitional Administration in Timor-Leste had all the
necessary resources to create lasting peace, in practice the diﬀerent assumptions about
policing between the UN, other bilateral donors, and local police forces culminated in a
lack of implementation of the ambitious plans and eventually led to renewed violence
against civilians and the army. In a similar vein, Kagoro (2018) ﬁnds that the British
Police Training Team (BPTT) that introduced community policing in Uganda in 1989 did
not intend it to become a major tool of the regime for its own survival, but rather saw
it as way to induce democratic norms and values. Of course, community policing pro-
grammes – as with all peacebuilding interventions – cannot be developed and
implemented without consideration of the context if the aims of such programmes are
to be met. There is a need to consider how such programmes might be received by the
JOURNAL OF INTERVENTION AND STATEBUILDING 17
various actors on the ground as well as how such programmes might interact with the
socio-political dynamics, historical and cultural speciﬁcities, and other peacebuilding
activities already underway or planned. As the articles by Kocak and Kagoro highlight, if
there is little regard for the historical (Kocak 2018) or political context (Kagoro 2018)
and the ways in which new programmes and concepts might be accepted, adapted or
‘mis-used’ by various actors, such programmes are unlikely to meet intended objectives
and be successful.
The complexity and political dimensions of security sector reform
The articles in this in this special issue contribute to understanding the complex and pol-
itical dimensions of SSR. The articles build upon previous research on SSR by investigating
patterns that lead to a variation of norm adoption, contestation and imposition, which
have a major impact on building long-term and inclusive peace. They also tackle questions
of contestation and co-operation between a multitude of diﬀerent actors beyond the level
of the state. The articles taken together show how both the multiplicity of and tension
between norms and actors further complicates eﬀorts to build peace. While opportunities
exist with the presence of actors beyond the level of the state and normative frameworks
beyond the vision of the donors from the Global North, the problems arising from con-
testation, confusion and tension cause delays, waste resources and threaten to derail
the peace process.
The politicised nature of DDR and SSR, concerning the redistribution of power within
society, namely through the security sector, adds to the complexity and risk. Drawing
from the insights of the articles in this collection, and from the application of complexity
theory to peacebuilding (de Coning 2018), we can see how proliferation of and contesta-
tion between actors, and between their normative positions, may be less likely to lead to
SSR and DDR programmes being eﬀectively implemented and intended outcomes being
achieved. The post-conﬂict environment is already complex, dynamic and non-linear; it
is not an empty canvas, singular moment, or static frame with which to impose, inform
or interact. The aim of any peacebuilding intervention is to inﬂuence this complex,
dynamic and non-linear social system that is the conﬂict-aﬀected environment (de
Coning 2018). An awareness of this complexity of context and process is required if SSR,
DDR and other peacebuilding interventions are to be successful and create a meaningful
peace for all in society. As part of this awareness, there is a need to attend to themultiplicity
of actors and how they might interact and inﬂuence, as well as how norms are adopted,
contested and imposed. This is necessary as it is contended that these aspects are critical
to how security and justice sector institutions are built, reformed or developed; how they
are subsequently regarded, accepted, or rejected by those the institutions ostensibly serve;
and ultimately the extent to which they contribute to rebuilding security and justice after
conﬂict and paving the way to sustainable, meaningful and comprehensive peace.
Ultimately, the complexity and political nature of SSR need to be acknowledged if SSR
programmes are to be successful. Fundamentally, there is a need to genuinely acknowl-
edge that programmes need to respond to the speciﬁcity of the context; its socio-political
dynamics, historical and cultural speciﬁcities, and the myriad of actors and activities
already present. Further, the diﬀerent actors engaged to a greater or lesser extent in deter-
mining the parameters, engaging in, or subject to SSR and related DDR programmes need
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to be acknowledged. What also needs to be recognised is that the extent of these actors’
engagement in SSR and DDR tends to reﬂect and, in turn, reinforces their position in
society. Hence, women tend to be marginalised and non-state security and justice provi-
ders tend to be overlooked. The status of actors also impacts outcomes, and so a high
number of veto players can compromise DDR eﬀorts and a military force which dominates
an economy can undermine the prospects of long-term peace. In short, these articles
demonstrate that what is required is an awareness of these complexities, building on
the opportunities and challenges presented in each speciﬁc context, and cognisant of
power and its manifestations and eﬀects.
Notes
1. For an excellent account of subjectiﬁcation and (lack of) contextualisation in defence reform in
the DRC see Baaz and Stern (2017).
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